The Quantum Hub

Authors: Rohit Kumar & Sidharth Deb

Published: 29th March, 2024 in Economic Times

On March 15th the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“MeitY”) issued a fresh AI advisory reversing key provisions from the March 1st version. It overturned a controversial requirement for intermediaries to obtain government approval before publicly launching ‘under-tested’ or ‘unreliable’ generative AI or other AI diffused deployments. The unclear scope and applicability of the original advisory, and the control the government was assigning itself, triggered widespread concerns about its legality and overall prospects for AI innovation.

Both advisories reflect the government’s concern about the rushed public launch of generative AI solutions. While the new advisory’s shift from approval-seeking towards labelling represents greater balance, this episode holds structural lessons on the need to align India’s approach to AI regulation with its ambition to lead the global frontier on AI development.

Considerations for Balanced AI Regulation

Firstly, regulation should avoid one-size-fits-all prescriptions. The language in the advisories do not appropriately differentiate between various use cases and deployments. This clubs all market participants and actors across the AI value chain. For instance, the advisories (especially the original advisory) fail to make any distinction between software, content recommending algorithms, generative AI deployments and larger foundation models. AI’s complexities means that each layer of the value chain poses a different level of risk and consequently requires a different targeted intervention. Classification is therefore needed to facilitate proportionate, risk-based and fit for purpose regulation.

Secondly, regulation should be rooted in AI’s technical realities. For example, the advisories state that AI deployments should not permit any bias or discrimination. While well intentioned, this is inconsistent with the technical consensus that completely eliminating AI bias is nearly impossible. Such regulations make innovators risk averse, cause widespread non-compliance, and invite the risk of arbitrary enforcement. Bias can perhaps be better tackled through standards on platform design and requirements of transparency, testing with diverse groups, human involvement, and weightage in training data.

Thirdly, without nuance, government permissions can stifle innovation. While concerns of under-testing and unreliability are valid, approvals prior to product rollout – akin to aviation, automobiles and pharmaceuticals – may be incompatible with fast-moving digital markets and may not be required in most use cases. In sectors where we create such controls for product safety, this is usually done to prevent immediate risk of public injury, death, health and safety. However, with digital technologies product safety often entails iterative processes where businesses adapt to live feedback loops from the market. For that reason, approval based regimes or special regulatory sandbox frameworks should be reserved only for the highest risk cases with clear demarcations between domains that are low risk and those that pose risk to human life or public safety e.g. the military, protected systems, critical information infrastructures and biosecurity.

Fourthly, while watermarking and labelling can be advised, we should not over index on any technology. The March 15^th notice advises platforms to adopt watermarking technologies along the lines of open protocols developed by initiatives like the C2PA. The advisory also suggests that platforms build capabilities to identify which users or systems make changes to any piece of content. While there is merit in exploring these ideas, it is a fact that watermarking remains an experimental technology and is prone to circumvention.

Way Forward

To ensure the development of India’s AI ecosystem, regulation must strike a balance between erecting appropriate safeguards and preserving market agility. We must urgently commence a comprehensive discussion on AI regulation. Advisories and amendments to regulate emerging technology through India’s IT Rules is unsustainable; these proposals are often untethered to the parent IT Act and are not grounded in adequate evidence.

The first pillar of reform should prioritise inclusive regulation through public consultations which marshal the collective intelligence of government, industry and civil society. These would help produce solutions which alleviate the burden of responsibility on government’s shoulders. Consultations would also help avoid reactive directives like the original advisory which can unintentionally erode value from the market.

Reform should also entail suitable investments in setting up an independent regulator. Such a regulator should be empowered through staffing, resources and tools which facilitate evidence-based regulation. India should minimise the discretionary involvement of the political executive in the next cycle of AI regulation. Instead, an independent regulator should promote standardisation, transparency, consumer redressal and public accountability.

Next, interventions on bias, trust and safety must serve local contexts. AI regulation should facilitate international businesses in forming local partnerships to solve for localised harms arising out of discrimination and exclusion. India’s diversity lends itself to competing narratives and consequently, deep local partnerships are essential to build for its socio-cultural heterogeneity.

Finally, similar to the US Executive Order, India should attempt to develop guidelines and benchmarks for AI assurance audits. Other tools worth exploring include AI impact assessments, security incident and vulnerability reporting databases etc.

At the end of the day, AI regulation needs robust future-proofing that is capable of swiftly adapting to the rapidly evolving tech landscape. A fragmented approach that is tied to an outdated legislation won’t cut it.

—

Rohit is the Founding Partner and Sidharth is a Manager at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a public policy firm

Authors: Suhani Pandey & Sonakshi Chaudhry

Published: 22nd February 2024 in Hindustan Times

India has made remarkable strides in the decline of child marriages over the last few decades and has led global progress to eliminate the practice. Child marriage is prohibited in India and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 envisions protecting the fundamental rights and liberties of minor girls and boys. Despite this, 1 in 3 of the world’s child brides live in India, and girls face a heightened risk of violence and poverty, along with violation of their right to education, health, and protection. Illustrating this, UNFPA analysis of NFHS-V data suggests that in terms of demographics, 48% of girls who were married below 18 years of age had received no education as compared to only 4% who gained higher education.

There is also a discrepancy in reported numbers, where despite high prevalence of child marriages recorded under NFHS-V (23.3%), National Crime Records Bureau’s (NCRB) annual ‘Crime in India’ report recorded an average of only around 360 incidents per year of child marriages between 2011 and 2020 under the Act. Due to pandemic-induced poverty perhaps, a sudden spike in child marriage cases was also reported both across the country and globally. Reported cases per NCRB data during this time were 785 in 2020, and shot up to 1050 in 2021, lowering only slightly to 1002 in 2022. More recently, in a written response to Parliament in August 2023, the Ministry of Women and Child Development (WCD) suggested that an increase in the number of reported cases under the Act could also be attributed to awareness initiatives and enhanced reporting mechanisms undertaken by various states. While this may be the case, the issue remains pernicious and multilayered, and there are several areas that need to be addressed to solve the problem, ranging from social norms and beliefs to the implementation of policies.

Implementation Gaps

Research by the Kailash Satyarthi Children’s Foundation highlights that there is high underreporting, but even for reported cases, more than 90% of child marriage cases were pending trial as of 2021 and the overall conviction rate under the Act has been found to be poor. Other barriers have also impeded the effective implementation of the Act due to wide variations in state capacity and institutional support. For instance, as per the WCD website, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand had either not formulated or not uploaded their rules as of 2020 under the law leaving crucial roles like the Child Marriage Prohibition Officers (CMPOs) unappointed. In late 2021, Uttar Pradesh’s Directorate of Women Welfare circulated draft rules for public consultation but the outcome of this exercise is unknown as the rules have still not been notified.

UNICEF data suggests that over half of India’s child brides reside in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and civil society organizations have sought the court’s support to ensure the effective implementation of the Act. In response to a petition filed before the Supreme Court last year, the Ministry of Women and Child Development has been asked to provide the steps taken for the effective implementation of the provisions of the Act. In Maharashtra, emphasizing the need for effective implementation of laws against child marriage, the  Bombay High Court has also requested information on the appointment details of Child Marriage Prohibition Officers.

Addressing the issue

To address the issue of child marriage in India, a comprehensive and cross-cutting approach is imperative. Prioritizing the fast-track trial of reported incidents under the Act, immediate notification of rules and the appointment of a Child Marriage Prohibition Officer (CMPO) equipped with the necessary infrastructure, is crucial. However, legal measures alone can prove insufficient. Holistic socio-economic solutions must be implemented to raise awareness among girls and their families and facilitate their improved access to education and support institutions, including financial networks.

In addition to socio-economic solutions, comprehensive measures will be required to streamline coordination and promote convergence among key stakeholders, including those charged with implementing the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act (JJA), the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA), the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses Act (POCSO), as well as police officers, district magistrates, child helpline coordinators, and shelter homes, who collectively strive to achieve the common objective of preventing child marriages.

The government can lead the way by prioritizing the swift implementation of rules under the Act and devising key policy measures for the empowerment of adolescent girls. Socio-behavioral change campaigns can go a long way in collectively raising awareness of society, challenging social norms and ensuring better reporting of incidents.

—

Suhani is Analyst, Public Policy & Sonakshi is Manager, Strategic Partnerships & Communications, at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a public policy firm.

Authors: Ujval Mohan and Salil Ahuja

Published: 12th February, 2024 in Hindu BusinessLine

The Bombay High Court’s split verdict on the constitutionality of the Indian Government’s proposed fact check unit (FCU) exemplifies the conundrum between countering the threat of misinformation and government involvement in fact checks. In 2023, FCUs emerged as the favoured policy intervention with governments in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Uttarakhand each citing the need for government intervention to control misinformation.

Safeguarding the integrity of civic discourse from manipulative disinformation campaigns is paramount, especially as India enters a pivotal election season. In principle, fact-checks can effectively counter false narratives that mislead users and cause real-world harm. While social media platforms have long partnered with third-party fact-checkers to warn users of false information, the threat of ‘fake news’ has grown in scale and sophistication.

However, FCU proposals denote a novel trend, where governments seek to fact check misleading narratives. This idea of governments emerging as official arbiters of truth is the subject of widespread scepticism. As more governments pour already scarce resources into setting up their own FCUs, addressing systemic limitations becomes crucial.

Who watches the watchdog?
With easy access to generative AI technologies, information pollution is becoming more abundant, powerful, and deceptive. At the same time, a large share of ‘false information’ online is likely innocuous and often a form of satire or artistic expression.

FCUs face the daunting task of sifting through this digital haystack to handpick harmful narratives that deserve their attention. This entails identifying information emerging from suspicious/inauthentic sources while analysing trends to look for harmful content. Justice Patel, who led the Bombay HC bench, raised a concern about “how few things are immutably black- or-white, yes or no, true or false” which could lead to an untenable system of coercive censorship of alternative views by the government.

Government actors ultimately sway to political incentives, which skews their outlook on narrative selection. Consequently, government FCUs may disproportionately target content critical of the government, while ignoring falsehoods that support its outlook. For instance, government-run FCUs in Malaysia and Thailand conspicuously stayed away from narratives about controversial regime changes and protests. In Singapore, the Minister empowered to issue directions to counter ‘fake news’, overwhelmingly used the power to target dissenting voices.

Unsurprisingly, FCUs proposed by both the Union Government and Tamil Nadu target misinformation only about themselves. Other FCUs are less clear about what narratives they will prioritise and how these choices will be made. With this format, FCUs will morph into tools of government counter-speech, deviating from their intended purpose of debunking falsehoods that bear the greatest risk of harm. The public interest in scrutinising claims solely about the government was questioned by the Court.

State action is often disproportionate
Each proposed Indian FCU has a different structure, but all of them are designed to either label content as misleading, facilitate take down, or prosecute errant social media users. Owing to inherent conflicts of interest, fact checks by the state are prone to public distrust, as well as legal challenges arising from free speech concerns.

For example, not all fake posts warrant penalties, but once flagged as ‘false’ by FCUs, users posting such content face the real possibility of being subject to prosecution. With instances of Indian police overriding legal safeguards to arrest users for innocuous social media content, citizens and journalists will be discouraged from online speech fearing FCU action. This is precisely at issue in another case before the Madras High Court, where petitioners argue that the FCU will muzzle voices critical of the state government.

Designing an effective FCU
The structural conflict of interest resulting from government intervention necessitates institutional independence and transparency in narrative selection. For example, proposed FCUs should insulate editorial decisions from government influence, regularly publish transparency reports, and decentralise fact checking functions to numerous independent fact checkers.

While the design of state-led FCUs can be improved, government efforts to counter misinformation would be far more effective if it instead focussed on enabling partnerships between social media platforms and a vibrant ecosystem of independent third-party checkers, rather than doing the fact checks themselves.

That said, even independent fact checkers need time to curate priority narratives, gather precise evidence, and fact-check claims, all before dangerous falsehoods mutate and gain traction. Therefore, fact checks alone cannot effectively counter the threat of harm from misinformation unless we slow down the spread of unverified/unsafe content. Creating ecosystem incentives that deprioritise virality in favour of trust should thus be another goal for policymakers.

Fact checks already battle challenges of online polarisation and the ‘backfire effect,’ where users double down on belief in falsehoods after they are debunked. Saddling fact checking with limitations that come with state control can render another blow to their efficacy.

—

Salil Ahuja is an Analyst and Ujval Mohan is a Senior Analyst working on technology policy issues at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a public policy firm.

 

 

Authors: Nipun Malhotra & Rohit Kumar
Date: 1^st Feb, 2024

Budgets in India have often been criticised for completely ignoring the rights of Persons with Disabilities. The country often seesaws between budgets that are considered “populist” where the disabled are ignored as they aren’t considered a big enough vote bank, or those that are considered “growth oriented”, ignoring the disabled because they are not looked at as an engine of growth.

This was a major reason why we were elated at the Finance Minister’s focus on inclusive growth as a theme for this budget. Within the first five minutes, under the section Garib Kalyan, Desh ka Kalyan she went on to say, “The schemes for empowerment of Divyangs and Transgender persons reflect firm resolve of our Government to leave no one behind”. Our hopes had been raised.

In the speech that lasted slightly under an hour, disability would not be mentioned again. The devil as they say, is in the details. The allocations for the Department of PwDs has remained largely the same for several years now. This year again, the government has budgeted a mere 1,225 crore for a department that is supposed to cater to accessibility and other needs of Persons with Disabilities. This is just 0.02% of the total budget outlay for a population estimated to be 16% of the total as per the World Health Organisation. In past years, the actual spend by the department has been even lower. For example, in 2022-23 (two years ago) only around 990 crore of the allocated budget of 1,212 crore was spent.

The “Scheme for implementation of Persons with Disability Act” has actually reduced its budget from 150 crore to 135 crore, perhaps because the revised estimate for last year (2023-24) was a mere 67 crore. This is extremely unfortunate considering the struggles faced in the implementation of the RPwD Act. When the Act came into force in 2017, government departments were given five years to make themselves accessible. Unfortunately, in the last year alone we have seen incidents like the one where wheelchair model Virali Modi was forced to be carried up a floor of steps to complete her wedding registration. The fact is, Virali was vocal and based in the buzzing metropolis of Mumbai. It’s unlikely that such an incident would even be reported if it were to happen in the local office of a much smaller city.

Accessibility is both a stock and a flow problem. Many government departments and buildings hide behind the excuse of ‘lack of budgets’ to not make themselves accessible. The Scheme for implementation of Persons with Disability Act needs to have a dedicated budget to ensure retrofitting of solutions for accessibility in old buildings and infrastructure.

It is also sad that this year again, there has been no allocation for the “Artificial Limbs Manufacturing Corporation of India” (ALIMCO) through the budget. This is in contrast to 2019–20 when 60 crore was allocated; budgetary allocations have only been cut in subsequent years. ALIMCO is the government’s premier disability aid manufacturer. This decrease in support to ALIMCO becomes particularly disappointing because on the one hand, GST is being charged on disability aids manufactured by the private sector and on the other, investments are not being made for ALIMCO to expand at a fast enough rate to keep pace with requirements.

There is planned investment in ALIMCO of 80 crore, but this is coming from IEBR (Internal and Extra Budgetary Resources – which constitutes the resources raised by PSUs through profits, loans and equity). It is great that ALIMCO is raising these funds but a stimulus from the government would only have helped, considering India’s rapidly aging demography which needs these disability aids as well.

We realise this was only an interim budget. However, it is unfortunate how successive Finance Ministers across governments have failed in setting a vision for the disabled community. Health insurance for what is in any case a very vulnerable community is not easily accessible, and private companies are not incentivized to develop more products for PwDs, even though courts have repeatedly pushed them to. While benefits under Ayushman Bharat can be availed, the scheme is not extended by default to people holding disability certificates and UDID cards, despite repeated demands by the community to institute this change.

Finally, beyond the budget figures, what was missing in the speech today was a roadmap to promote entrepreneurs with disabilities, a vision for assistive technology, stimulus to provide accessible infrastructure and jobs for the disabled. But more importantly, it was a stark reminder that the promise of “sabka saath, sabka vikas” is predicated on collective action. We hope this serves as a reminder to India’s disabled community that we must mobilise, vocalise and channel our energies to ensure that our interests are taken into account when successive governments lay out the year’s accounts.

—

Nipun Malhotra is the founder of Nipman Foundation. Rohit Kumar is the co-founder of Young Leaders for Active Citizenship (YLAC) and The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a multi sectoral public policy firm.

Authors: Sona Mitra, Devika Oberai, and Sayak Sinha

Published: 19th January in Hindu BusinessLine

According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2023, women make up only 29.2% of all STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) workers across 146 countries. In India, research by Muralidhar and Ananthanarayanan (2023) highlighted that across 100 Indian universities, only 16.6% of the overall STEM faculty were women. Within this, the latest All India Survey on Higher Education (2020-21) reports women make up 42.3% of the sample in STEM education- including undergraduate, postgraduate, MPhil, and PhD courses. However, within this too, girls are concentrated in life sciences, with programs such as B.Tech comprising only 28.7% of women. Across premier institutions such as IITs, women constitute about 20% of the sample.

The gaps in STEM arise due to certain factors that operate in the early phases in girls’ education. Social conditioning arising from existing norms and perceptions about the roles of girls and women in the society often leads in shaping the choices that girls make while enrolling themselves into higher education.  The conditioning of young children continues even within the school systems where the curriculum and pedagogical practises undermine the self-esteem and confidence of girls.

In order to address these gaps at the entry level, interventions that inspire younger girls to meaningfully engage with STEM need to take shape early. Programmes like Vigyaan Jyoti implemented by the Dept. of Science and Technology comprising  of activities such as counseling, role-model interactions, etc. currently target high school students. Similar interventions targeting younger students implemented at an earlier stage could prove useful. Similarly, fortifying Foundational Literacy and Numeracy outcomes through increased financial investment, gender-responsive teacher-training modules and robust assessment and monitoring frameworks can all contribute to improved higher-education outcomes for girls.

The other major challenge is the retention of women within the STEM ecosystem. Early data from Key Global Workforce Insights Report (2015) suggest that even when women choose STEM careers , 45% reported challenges in upward mobility and as many as 81% believed that there is a gender-bias in the internal evaluation processes. Further, the government’s labourforce survey in 2020-21 suggests a gender pay-gap with men earning 35 percent more than women across all sectors, thus demotivating the intent to stay in the labor force.  Evidence from professors at IIT Kanpur found that women working as scientists in lab-based occupations face isolation in male dominated labs that often manifest in lack of support for women colleagues, and losing out on networking opportunities for women that hinder upward mobility. Such trends often also end up in undervaluing women’s research and findings within the labs.

Promoting women and retaining them through targeted interventions by key actors becomes critical. At an institutional level, policies that afford flexibility of time, comprehensive child-care provisions, and supportive infrastructure are crucial in creating an environment conducive to sustained participation of women. Addressing the gender-pay gap in STEM holds potential to incentivize women to persist in STEM careers. The Dept. of Science and Technology has introduced the GATI (Gender Advancement for Transforming Institutions) charter which is a voluntary, signatory charter to nudge research institutions to support diversity and inclusion. The charter encourages gender-agnostic hiring, maternity leaves, non-discriminatory appraisals, etc. and has shown promising results across 30 pilot institutions such as IIT Delhi, University of Delhi, Jamia Millia Islamia, etc. Making these charters mandatory rather than voluntary, thus, has the potential to retain more women in prestigious institutions.

Facilitating re-entry is essential for retaining women in the field. Returnship programs adopted by few companies, have demonstrated promise in facilitating the reintegration of women into workplaces after career breaks, thereby allowing them to resume their professional trajectories.  Mahindra’s ‘Back to Mahindra’ initiative is specifically designed to aid former women employees transition back to work. The Federal Bank recently introduced the ‘Maternity Work Buddy’ initiative, offering support to expectant mothers by providing updates on the workplace during their maternity leaves. The HCL-Tech Returnship and Microsoft’s Leap Program offer short-term professional engagements to those out of the workforce.

While increasing women’s participation in STEM is challenging and layered with several dimensions – it can be meaningfully addressed by increasing targeted interventions as already discussed. The state has an important role – as the most powerful actor, it can not only raise awareness and improve its own initiatives but also effectively activate the private sector participation to enable entry and re-entry of women and girls in STEM education and occupations.

—

Sona and Sayak are at the Initiative for What Works to Advance Gender Equality (IWWAGE), and Devika is an Associate at The Quantum Hub (TQH).

Authors: Rohit Kumar and Mahwash Fatima

Published: 8^th January 2024 in the Hindustan Times

What would your elderly father’s response be if they received an emergency video message from you requesting a large sum of money? With rapid advances in artificial intelligence, normal human reaction to such situations can easily be exploited through the creation of deepfakes.

Deepfakes is undoubtedly one of the biggest threats our society is likely to face in 2024. No wonder the union government has taken up this issue on priority. It has already sent an advisory to social media intermediaries asking them to strengthen their systems for detecting and taking down deepfakes. News reports also suggest that the Ministry of Electronics and IT is considering fresh amendments to the Information Technology (IT) Rules to include specific obligations for intermediaries to contain the deepfake menace.

It was in 2017 when deepfake content made its first notable appearance with a Reddit user named ‘deepfakes’ posting fake videos of celebrities. Over the years, with the development of the underlying technology, these videos have become increasingly realistic, and deceptive. Between 2019 and 2020, the number of deepfake online content has increased by over 900%, with some forecasts predicting that as much as 90% of online content may be synthetically generated by 2026.

The most worrying societal harm from the rise of misinformation and deepfakes is the erosion of trust in our information ecosystem. Not knowing who or what to believe can do unimaginable damage to how humans interact and engage with each other. A recent empirical study has in fact shown that the mere existence of deepfakes feeds distrust in any kind of information, whether true or false.

In India, while no legislation specifically governs deepfakes, existing laws such as the IT Act and the Indian Penal Code already criminalise online impersonation, malicious use of communication devices, obscene publishing etc. Social media platforms are also obligated under the IT Rules to take down misinformation and impersonating content; failure to do so means risking their ‘safe harbour’ provision and being liable for the harm that ensues.

Unfortunately, while these legal provisions already exist, it is challenging to execute what the law demands. First, identifying deepfakes is a massive technical challenge. Currently available options – AI powered detection and watermarking/labelling techniques – are inconsistent and inaccurate. Notably, OpenAI pulled its own AI detection tool due to ‘low accuracy’ in July 2023.

Second, technologies that are used to create deepfakes have positive use-cases too. For instance, these same technologies can be used to augment accessibility tools for persons with disabilities, deployed in the entertainment industry for more realistic special effects, and even used in the education sector. Essentially, what this means is that every piece of content that has been edited digitally doesn’t necessarily make it harmful. This further complicates the job of content moderation.
Third, the volume of content uploaded every second makes meaningful human oversight difficult. Unfortunately, by the time problematic content is detected, it has often already spread.

Policymakers around the world are struggling to find a good solution to the problem. The US and the EU seem to have taken some initial steps, but their efficacy remains untested. In the US, President Biden signed an executive order in October 2023 to address AI risks. Under this order, the Department of Commerce is creating standards for labelling AI-generated content. Separately, states like California and Texas have passed laws criminalising the dissemination of deepfake videos influencing elections, while Virginia penalises the distribution of non-consensual deepfake pornography. In Europe, the Artificial Intelligence Act will categorise AI systems into unacceptable, high, limited, and low risk. Notably, AI systems that generate or manipulate image, audio or video content (i.e. deepfakes), will be subjected to transparency obligations.

Technologists are also working on ways to accurately trace the origins of synthetic media. One of these attempts by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) aims to cryptographically link each piece of media with its origin and editing history. However, the challenge with C2PA’s approach lies in widespread adoption of these standards by devices and editing tools, without which unlabelled AI-generated content will continue to deceive.

Therefore, while watermarking and labelling may help, what we need urgently is a focused attempt to reduce the circulation of deepfake content. Slowing down the circulation of flagged content until its veracity is confirmed can be crucial in preventing real-world harm. This is where intermediaries such as social media platforms can perhaps be required to step in more strongly. If an uploaded piece of content is detected to be AI modified or flagged by users, platforms should mark such content for review before allowing unchecked distribution.

Finally, there is no substitute to building resilience among the audience. Fostering media literacy to help people of all ages better understand the threat of misinformation, to make them more conscious consumers of information is the need of the hour.

Navigating the new digital era where ‘seeing is no longer believing’ is undoubtedly challenging. We need a multi-pronged regulatory approach that nudges all ecosystem actors to not only prevent and detect deepfake content, but also to engage with it more wisely. Anything less is unlikely to retain our trust in the digital world.

—
Rohit is Founding Partner and Mahwash a Senior Analyst at The Quantum Hub (TQH), a public policy firm. 

Author: Sumeysh Srivastava
Published: 10^th January 2024 in the Economic Times

The Telecommunications Bill 2023 has been notified into law; it is now an Act. While the revamp of the primary 1885 legislation that has so far governed telecommunications in India is a welcome move, the new law has led to mixed reactions.

The treasury benches and some other commentators have indeed welcomed the Act, calling it a future proof framework which will boost growth of India’s digital economy. Provisions related to spectrum allocation, right of way and deployment of infrastructure are being seen as enablers. However, there has also been commentary which has critiqued the Act for its lack of detailing and for increasing government powers at the cost of user rights, specifically calling out the new provisions on interception and internet shutdowns.

The Act is indeed a manifestation of Schrödinger’s thought experiment: it can be seen as both good and bad, depending on how it is interpreted and implemented.

A pivotal aspect of the Act is the introduction of the concept of authorization for the provision of telecom services. Authorization is basically like deciding entry to a party; it can manifest in various forms, from the velvet rope of licensing, to the full freedom of open entry, with other forms such as general authorization and registration being made available as well. However, the Act lacks specificity regarding the type of authorization that may be mandated or even the factors which would determine the scope of licensing. This is unlike other countries which clearly spell out the specifics. For instance, in Europe, Electronic Communication Services are subject to a general authorisation regime, with individual licensing being considered on the basis of factors such as usage of scarce resources, threat to public health etc. Similarly, the Nigerian Communications Commission Act details the principles and considerations to be kept in mind while formulating licensing procedures.

Not only is such detailing desirable, it is also of legal necessity. In the 2001 Kishan Prakash case, for instance, the Supreme Court had explicitly said that the legislature should not delegate its core law-making functions; it must set limits on the power that is being delegated by declaring the policy behind the law and laying down clear standards for guidance.

In a recent media interaction, the Honourable Minister has clarified that this government does not intend for the Act to cover OTT communication services like Whatsapp and Telegram which are separately regulated under the Information Technology Act. This is much appreciated. However, the broad definitions of terms such as “message” and “telecommunication” still leave room for the Act’s provisions to be extended to internet-based communication services via the Rules and the Minister’s clarification may hold no legal value in court if a future government were to interpret it so. Here we could have picked on best practices from other countries, such as the Telecommunications Act 2001 of New Zealand which also uses a broad definition of “telecommunication” but clarifies that only those telecommunication services which are explicitly listed under schedule 1 of the Act are to be regulated. A detailed procedure has also been given to add services to the schedule, which involves a recommendation from New Zealand’s Commerce Commission. This ensures that the scope of the legislation cannot be expanded easily; it also provides for more certainty.

A lack of detailing is also seen in other crucial aspects of the Telecom Act. For example, with reference to the measures related to interception or blocking, while the term “safeguards” is mentioned, there is no detailing on what these could be, or the framework to be followed to ensure that the power is not misused. The Honourable Minister has mentioned in Parliament that interception measures under the new law will adhere to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the telephone-tapping People’s Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) case of 1996. However, in the PUCL case, the court had explicitly commented on the lack of procedural safeguards in the legislation. The Telecom Act 2023 was an opportunity to remedy this and provide a more secure framework for interception within the law itself.

When it comes to regulating rapidly evolving technology, the need to retain flexibility in implementation is understandable, and perhaps, even beneficial. But, the lack of guiding principles in the parent legislation also means that Rules issued under this Act can be changed easily. Not only can this risk user rights, it can also create uncertainty for businesses by leading to unnecessary litigation.

The Telecom Act 2023, in its current form, can be both – a shiny new phone with the same old software, or a revolutionary rocket that can turbocharge Bharat’s digital economy. Like Schrödinger’s cat, there is no way to know just yet.

—
Sumeysh is a Senior Manager at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a public policy firm

Authors: Aparajita Bharti and Mitali Nikore
Published: 29^th December 2023 in the Hindustan Times

“All women, girls and persons who menstruate are able to experience menstruation in a manner that is safe, healthy and free from stigma”. This is the overarching aim of India’s recent Draft Menstrual Hygiene Policy 2023. But are paid period leaves the best tool to achieve this aim?

Overall, even today, nearly 65% of all working women in India are employed in the agriculture sector, about 40% are helpers in household enterprises, and almost a third run their own small businesses. Only 24% of working age urban women are employed, as opposed to 40% of rural women. Even amongst urban women, almost half of whom are in regular salaried employment, close to 55% work without a written contract, and 45% are not eligible for any paid leave.

In this scenario, legally mandated paid period leaves funded by employers are likely to, first, only be offered to a small subsection of women working in the urban corporate sector, and, second, may serve to create additional barriers for those women who are yet to enter formal employment.  By imposing an additional cost on employers linked only to employees who menstruate, the unintended adverse impact on women’s participation in the workforce may end up far outweighing the benefit of any such legislation. Further, it discriminates against small and medium enterprises, nearly a fifth of which are led by women, which may lack financial resources to meet these legal obligations.

The Union Minister Ms. Smriti Irani recently alluded to this risk, which is in fact based on existing evidence from the implementation of laws such as the six months paid maternity leave. For this reason, even in countries like Spain, where menstrual leave has been legislated, the bill is footed by the public security system and menstruators need a doctor’s note certifying debilitating symptoms to avail them. Further, women who have not previously paid into Spain’s social security for the preceding six months are not eligible. All these guardrails are an explicit recognition of the risk of discrimination in hiring, retention, and promotion, in case employers are legally mandated to pay for unconditional menstrual leaves.

So where do we begin in India, given our large informal economy and low female labour force participation. Our answer – look beyond legally mandated paid period leave towards an all-of-society approach. 

First, focus on the infrastructure around menstrual hygiene management. It’s 2023, and workplaces still continue to exist without separate or clean toilets for women, even in major metro cities and even government’s own offices. Rather than paid period leave, Central and State governments can prioritize establishing minimum legally mandated standards for separate, clean, well-maintained toilets for men, women, persons with disabilities, as well as gender neutral toilets with sufficient provisions for free or subsidized period products, and dignified, green, menstrual waste disposal facilities.

Second, encourage the private sector to be a partner in menstrual hygiene management. The Draft Policy calls for private sector companies to allocate a portion of their corporate social responsibility funds towards MHM initiatives. Companies can allocate their CSR funds for distribution of free sanitary products, supporting social enterprises or community-based organizations engaged in production of sanitary products, improving sanitation infrastructure, and raising awareness.

Third, enhance government funding for menstrual hygiene management through effective gender budgeting. For truly implementing the Draft Policy objectives and targets, government would need to enhance the financial resource envelope for MHM initiatives. While many states have already launched schemes that involve free distribution of sanitary napkins to schoolgirls, these can be expanded to cover additional locations, such as government offices and construction sites. Moreover, government schemes can be developed to upgrade women’s toilets in public spaces, and offer subsidies to women entrepreneurs for manufacturing MHM products.

Fourth, voluntary codes and partnerships to uphold existing labour laws. Arguably, better quality working conditions should be accessible to all Indian women. However, as it is widely known, ensuring provision of minimum working conditions even under the existing labour laws is an ongoing challenge. Civil society can galvanise communities and create voluntary codes around minimum wages, paid weekly leave, overtime allowance, access to toilet and hygiene facilities for marginalised workers. These voluntary codes can be adopted by groups of citizens like private sector organisations, resident welfare associations, market associations and business chambers to improve enforcement of existing laws.

Fifth, organized sector enterprises can offer flexible work arrangements or leaves, as a benefit to their employees. Even without legal mandates, some companies are beginning to recognise that offering period leaves or work from home for menstruators who require rest / medical attention improves employee morale, increases loyalty, and boosts labor productivity. For instance, after Zomato Ltd. introduced a menstrual leave policy in 2020, many others followed, such as Swiggy, Byju’s, Orient Electric and Magzter, amongst others.

There is no argument that workplaces need to accommodate biological differences between co-workers. Further, there is no argument that a large section of menstruators experience a wide range of health complications— cramps, back and muscle pains, bloating, headaches, nausea, among others. However, it is arguable that a legal mandate for employer-funded menstrual leaves is the right course for India at this juncture. We need an all-of-society approach to ensure better conditions for menstruators in India.

—
Aparajita Bharti is a Founding Partner at TQH Consulting, a policy research and advisory firm; Mitali Nikore is Founder & Chief Economist, Nikore Associates. 

Author: Sidharth Deb
Published: 12^th December 2023 in the Economic Times

India’s MoS for Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) Rajeev Chandrasekhar made two notable observations at the UK’s international AI Safety Summit last month. First, he argued that different governments must collaborate on AI governance. Second, he contended that authorities must learn from earlier experiences with social media where regulation struggled to keep pace with the ecosystem’s evolution. Mr. Chandrasekhar concluded his speech by inviting participants to the Global Partnership of Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) summit to be hosted by India in December. India was also one of 29 signatories to the Summit’s Bletchley Declaration which largely addresses mitigation strategies against existential risks emanating from ‘frontier’ AI models.

GPAI: An Opportunity for Enduring Policy Leadership

As GPAI’s global chair, India has an opportunity to contribute progressively to the international AI governance discourse. This will require shifting away from traditional notions of command-and-control regulation premised on prescriptive compliance and liability.

When technologies like AI evolve at exponential rates there is an inordinate risk of widespread non-compliance. Additionally, enforcement becomes challenging, and regulations can quickly become redundant. This creates widespread uncertainty and undue liability risks. Ultimately, prescriptive regulation can inhibit competition since only those market participants with the adequate risk appetite will continue to innovate.

Instead, India should favour partnerships which pursue flexible safeguards, transparency, knowledge sharing, accountability, economic growth, and development. To ensure balance, governments must attempt to dynamically mitigate AI’s multifaceted risks and create a framework for responsible innovation. The framework should constructively engage with substantive issues without getting bogged down with challenges like the feasibility of prescriptive regulation. This can be viewed as phase one in the life cycle of AI governance where India lays sound foundational aspects which advance state capacity.

India’s GPAI stewardship could echo some contemporary international developments like the US’ Presidential executive order (EO) on AI safety and security, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process, and other voluntary commitments made by tech majors at prior government interactions.

Six Ideas for India’s AI Stewardship

First, governments must raise their capacity to engage with AI’s wide applicability across domains like healthcare, climate change, financial services, education, agriculture, housing, and urban development. Such broad applicability requires knowledge exchange. MeitY, under its IndiaAI initiative, should facilitate a whole of government approach to AI oversight. Different sectoral authorities should collaborate with stakeholders to develop a publicly accessible repository of AI deployments and use cases. This will empower sectoral authorities with better information to commence dialogues around developing sector specific codes of practice on responsible AI development.

Second, robust standards development will assist with quality assurance. India should grant the appropriate resources to technical institutions like the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and the Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate to pursue such conversations across AI use cases. India should leverage government-to-government channels to facilitate MoUs through which these institutions can collaborate with international counterparts like the US Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology. In due course MeitY, BIS and STQC could codify standards for AI safety and trustworthiness which could serve as nutrition label equivalents for India’s AI ecosystem.

Third, India should commence an international project to explore scientific solutions to navigate the negative impacts of deep fake technologies. India’s current criminal and intermediary legal systems only offer after-the-fact remedies. However, the damage from malicious deployments commences as soon as content is created and distributed. The US EO discusses examining digital watermarking technologies as a possible solution. India should commence dialogue with international initiatives like the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity. Decision makers need to  better understand the capabilities and limitations of these technologies, and commence a dialogue to reorient how the public recognises artificial content over the internet.

Fourth, the US and UK have announced setting up national AI Safety Institutes which will work with companies to monitor and ensure the safety of ‘frontier’ AI models. This is to manage the unintended consequences of powerful AI models and the risks stemming from potential misuse by malicious actors to carry out cyber-enabled attacks against critical information infrastructures. India should consider setting up a similar AI safety institute which closely works with cybersecurity institutions like CERT-In and the NCIIPC. Such an institution should also be pushed to interface with the aforementioned international equivalents.

Fifth, governments must proactively address AI’s impact on labour markets. This impact is not uniform across sectors and varies substantially depending on the nature of deployment. Relevant ministries should support studies to quantify the impact of AI on labour markets to estimate job substitution and adaption. Such studies will inform policymakers on appropriate social security and upskilling interventions.

Finally, AI’s risks are well documented across criminal justice/policing, housing, financial services and healthcare. The risks intersect with issues like accuracy, bias, discrimination, exclusion, citizen privacy, etc. As governments explore how AI can improve public service delivery and other government functions, public trust will be imperative for long run sustainability. India should establish legislation which safeguards citizens’ rights against the risks of Government AI deployments. Such legislation will bring more certainty to Government projects, minimise unforeseeable litigation risks, and position India as an international exemplar for government use of AI.

—
Sidharth Deb is Public Policy Manager at The Quantum Hub (TQH Consulting).

Authors: Devika Oberai and Ujval Mohan
Published: 13^th December 2023 in The Mint

UN data over the past decade has maintained that as many as one in three women globally have experienced physical and/or sexual violence. Indian women too reel from exposure to risks of gender based violence (GBV), exacerbated by deeply entrenched patriarchy and limited state capacity to intervene.

To its credit, India has enacted strong legislative frameworks to instil deterrence against GBV and provide protective support to survivors. Aside from stringent penalties under the Indian Penal Code for sexual assault and harassment, dedicated gender-responsive laws address intimate partner and familial violence (PWDVA 2005), workplace sexual harassment (PoSH 2013), and female foeticide (PCPNDT 1994). Going further, the government has proactively conceptualised policies that set up one stop crisis centres (OSCs), fund safety upgrades in public spaces (Nirbhaya Fund) and set-up women’s shelter homes (Swadhar Greh).

Multi-pronged efforts and rising public awareness has helped India dent the under-reporting problem to a certain extent, with recent trends indicating more survivors coming forth to report GBV. However, even accounting for this, GBV casts an ominous shadow on India’s aspirations to foster women-led development. The International day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, observed on 25th November, and the ensuing 16 Days of Activism are thus an opportune time to reflect on what India can do better to prevent GBV and protect survivors.

Allocative Efficiencies

First, we need to re-examine how resources to combat GBV are allocated. Today, state functionaries who respond and enforce anti-GBV laws often have to overcome inadequate resources, limited bandwidth, and a lack of meaningful supervision and coordination. For instance, laws related to domestic violence, female foeticide, and sexual violence are administered by different officials, who typically undertake these functions as ‘additional charges’ over and above their existing revenue/administration functions.

Re-imagining the administrative machinery with an eye on allocative efficiencies can optimise the use of available funding. Clubbing resources in the hands of a single motivated agency tasked solely with GBV response is likely to be more effective than thinly spreading resources out amongst a number of uncoordinated officials. This would unlock the potential to enable closer monitoring of GBV data and response efforts, prioritisation of more vulnerable groups or areas, and meaningful oversight and training for protection officers, police, and other functionaries. As an example, the US noted increased efficiency in combating GBV when it concentrated resources under the Office on Violence Against Women.

Aligning incentives 

Second, we must take stock of the deep trust deficit that has taken root between the state and her citizens in enabling justice. Despite continuous and appreciable efforts, survivors are still met with reluctance and scepticism when filing complaints, advised to ‘reconcile’ with aggressors, or find themselves in understaffed or ill-equipped Crisis Centres or shelter homes.

Turning the tide on these trends requires us to double down on gender sensitization training to augment responders’ capacity, which a vast civil society network is already engaged in.

At the same time, there is a need to strengthen the functionaries’ incentive to act in the best interests of the victim. Equipping survivors and watchdog organisations with a cause of action against officials for failing to discharge their duties can be an empowering tool for survivors to demand that the officials act as the law promises. The ‘carrot’ of meaningful capacity building, coupled with the ‘stick’ of consequences for inaction, can signal a reset in the relationship between survivors and the state.

Investing in Social Norm Change

Finally, it is imperative to acknowledge that, at its core, GBV is driven by deep-seated patriarchal norms that have been resilient against decades of state counter-efforts. Thus far, GBV response has largely remained reactive, and has even involved heightened surveillance on women. Without targeted interventions, the legacy of gender inequality is inherited by each next generation. India therefore needs to operationalise the equality objective of the National Education Policy, 2020 by implementing comprehensive gender-norm corrective interventions at all levels of school education.

There is now emerging evidence that early-age interventions reduce propensity towards GBV, thus preventing a problem well before it takes root. It is encouraging that states like Odisha (in partnership with UNICEF) are using gender-responsive modules to strengthen inclusive learning outcomes in students. Such initiatives recognise that while investing in social norm change is a long game that demands commitment and patience, it could by far be the most effective in protecting Indian women.

India correctly identified women-led development as a priority during its G20 presidency. However, preventing GBV and acting against it is an absolute prerequisite for women to realise their full potential.

—
Ujval Mohan and Devika Oberai are, respectively, Senior Analyst and Public Policy Associate at The Quantum Hub (TQH Consulting).

Authors: Swathi Rao, Aparajita Bharti, Sona Mitra
Published: 30^th October 2023 in the Hindustan Times

The year 2023 marks a milestone as India becomes the world’s most populous country, accompanied by the promise of a burgeoning working-age population (15-59 years) that could drive an economic boom. However, this could be hampered by a lower number of women in the workforce. Government surveys reveal a decade of low rates of workforce participation (WPR) of women at a mere 26.6% (2021-22), further exacerbated by women’s confinement to low-paying and low-productivity jobs in the informal sector.

Skilling is an important lever for improving employability, and therefore, policymakers are prioritising these initiatives. Some of these include revamping Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs), setting up National Skill Training Institutes, and creating 5,000 skill hubs, aligned with the aim of the National Education Policy 2020 to integrate practical vocational training into school curricula. There are also focused initiatives to improve the uptake of such programmes among girls. The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship signed an MoU with the Ministry of Women and Child Development last year to improve skills of girls in non-traditional livelihoods and to ensure a smooth transition from skills to jobs. In such an ecosystem, apprenticeships offer a transition pathway by extending job-relevant training.

Under the Apprenticeship Act 1961, firms in India with six or more employees could engage apprentices, forming 2.5% to 10% of their workforce. A 2015 Government assessment reported that a skilled workforce of over 20 lakhs could be created if central public undertakings, central government, banking, and eligible MSMEs were to engage the minimum prescribed number of apprentices. Currently, the Indian government administers two primary apprenticeship programs: the National Apprentice Promotion Scheme (NAPS) and the National Apprentice Training Scheme (NATS). However, the gender-neutral design of both initiatives has played a role in fostering gender bias, which in turn, has led to the underrepresentation of women in apprenticeships.

Gender Disparities in India’s apprenticeship programs.

As of June 2023, NAPS has engaged 20,49,297 apprentices, of which 80% are male (16,44,071) while only 20% are female (4,07,568). NAPS has leveraged monthly apprenticeship melas to spread awareness and recruit apprentices during the last two-three years. Even though these melas have successfully doubled the number of apprentices between 2020-21 and 2021-22, the engagement of female apprentices remains disproportionately low.

To ensure gender-inclusive apprenticeship programs and expand their impact, a comprehensive approach is essential. This involves both tailoring initiatives to address women’s needs and extending apprenticeship opportunities across sectors. We must formulate apprenticeship programs that are women and girls-friendly by creating appropriate infrastructure for supporting and enabling women and girls, providing access to mentorship, incentivising participation in male-dominated vocations, and encouraging a role-model approach towards skilling and apprenticeship. Encouraging government apprenticeship initiatives to drive demand in others can also be effective in bringing in more women and girls.

Enhancing NAPS also requires commitment to gathering gender-disaggregated data to tailor interventions effectively. It also demands laying out a clear choice of programs, highlighting successful stories, and supportive budgetary allocations with specific targets for women and girls. The key is also to reimagine skill development, integrating foundational, transferable, and vocational skills into secondary and higher education as women’s enrolment to formal institutions across education levels increases. Industry engagement is pivotal for the success of these interventions.

Notably, Switzerland’s Vocational and Professional Education and Training (VPET) model stands as a remarkable example of effective integration of the education and skilling ecosystem. About two-thirds of Swiss youth engage in apprenticeships by age 15. VPET offers impressive flexibility, enabling seamless transitions between professions and bridging academic and vocational paths. The dual VET system is recognised as instrumental to the nation’s economic prosperity.

Switzerland’s VPET system is part of a larger trend in Europe, where several countries embrace “dual” vocational education and training, effectively combining classroom learning with practical workplace experiences. In Switzerland, 41% of VET upper secondary students are women; this is lower than the overall OECD countries average, where women students account for 45% enrolments in vocational programs. However, even with a more overall equitable distribution of enrolments, across countries men tend to dominate STEM fields (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), while women are more prominent in areas like business, administration, law, services, health, and welfare. To address this issue, some countries have implemented measures to encourage greater female participation. For instance, in Ireland, employers who hire female craft apprentices can receive financial incentives in the form of a bursary for each female apprentice they register. This initiative has recently expanded to include all programs with more than 80% representation of a single gender.

The overall success of the European models of apprenticeships underlines the importance of data driven policy designs that can potentially be transformative in nature. Apprenticeships are powerful tools and mechanisms for transitions from education and training into jobs and need to be gender inclusive in their design. While the European examples may not be directly applicable to the Indian context, the principles of leveraging high-quality data, embracing comprehensive and inclusive program designs, and harnessing the power of incentives can serve as valuable lessons to enhance the gender responsiveness of Indian apprenticeship initiatives.

—
Swathi Rao is Analyst and Aparajita Bharti is Founding Partner at The Quantum Hub (TQH Consulting), and Sona Mitra is Principal Economist, IWWAGE.