The Quantum Hub

Author: Sidharth Deb
Published: 2nd December, 2024 in The Hindu

Last month, India’s IT Ministry convened meetings with industry and experts to discuss setting up an AI Safety Institute under the IndiaAI Mission. Curiously, this came on the heels of PM Modi’s visit to the US that was punctuated by the Quad Leaders’ Summit and the UN’s Summit of the Future. AI appeared high on the agenda in the run up to the Summit of the Future, with a high-level UN advisory panel producing a report on Governing AI for Humanity.

Policymakers should build on India’s recent leadership at international fora like the G20 and GPAI, and position it as a unifying voice for the global majority in AI governance. As the IT Ministry considers the new Safety Institute, its design should prioritise raising domestic capacity, capitalise on India’s comparative advantages and plug into international initiatives.

Notably, the UN’s Summit of the Future yielded the Global Digital Compact that identifies multistakeholder collaboration, human-centric oversight and inclusive participation of developing countries as essential pillars of AI safety and governance. As a follow up the UN will now commence a Global Dialogue on AI. It would be timely for India to establish an AI Safety Institute which engages with the Bletchley Process on AI Safety. If executed correctly, India can deepen the global dialogue on AI safety and bring human centric perspectives to the forefront of discussions.

Decoupling Institutional Capacity from Regulation Making

In designing the institute, India should learn from concerns levelled against MeitY’s AI Advisory from March 2024. The advisory’s proposal for government approvals prior to the public rollout of experimental AI systems was met with widespread criticism. A fundamental critique was what kind of institutional capability resides within India’s government to suitably determine the safety of novel AI deployments. Other provisions within the advisory on bias, discrimination and the one size fits all treatment of all AI deployments, further indicated that the advisory was not based on technical evidence.

Similarly, India should be cautious and avoid prescriptive regulatory controls which have been proposed in the EU, China and the recently vetoed California proposal. The threat of regulatory sanction in a rapidly evolving technological ecosystem, quells proactive information sharing between businesses, governments and the wider ecosystem. It nudges labs to only undertake the minimum steps towards compliance. Yet each jurisdiction demonstrates a recurring recognition of establishing specialised agencies e.g. China’s algorithms registry, EU’s AI Office, and California’s scrapped proposal to set up a Frontier Models Board. However, to maximise the promise of institutional reform, India should decouple institution building from regulation making.

The Promise of the Bletchley Process and Shared Expertise

The Bletchley process is underscored by the UK Safety Summit in November 2023 and the South Korea Safety Summit in May 2024. The next summit is set for France and this process is yielding an international network of AI Safety Institutes.

The US and UK were the first two to set up these institutes and have already signed an MoU to exchange knowledge, resources and expertise. Both institutions are also signing MoUs with AI labs and receiving early access to large foundation models. They have installed mechanisms to share technical inputs with the AI labs prior to their public rollouts. These Safety Institutes facilitate proactive information sharing without being regulators. They are positioned as technical government institutions that leverage multistakeholder consortiums and partnerships to augment testing capabilities of assessing the risk of frontier AI models to public safety. However, these Institutes largely consider AI safety through the lens of cybersecurity, critical infrastructure security, safety of the biosphere, and other national security threats.

These safety institutes aim to improve government capacity and mainstream the idea of external third-party testing, risk mitigations and assessments, red teaming protocols and standardisation’s role in shaping responsible AI development. AI safety institutions aim to deliver insights which can transform AI governance into an evidence-based discipline– a prerequisite for proportionate, fit for purpose regulation. The Bletchley process presents India with an opportunity to collaborate with governments and stakeholders from across the world. Shared expertise will be essential to keep up with AI’s rapid innovation trajectories.

Charting India’s Approach

India should establish an AI Safety Institute which integrates into the Bletchley network of safety institutes. For now, the Institute should be independent from rulemaking and enforcement authorities. Instead, it should operate exclusively as a technical research, testing, and standardisation agency. The Institute would allow India’s domestic institutions to tap into the expertise of other governments, local multistakeholder communities and international businesses. While upscaling its AI oversight capabilities India can also use the Bletchley network to advance the global majority’s concerns with AI’s individual centric risks.

The Institute could champion perspectives on risks relating to bias, discrimination, social exclusion, gendered risks, labour markets, data collection and individual privacy. Consequently, the Indian Institute could deepen the global dialogue around harm identification, big picture AI risks, mitigations and standards. If done right India may become a global steward for forward thinking AI governance which embraces multistakeholderism and government collaboration. Moreover, the AI Safety Institute can demonstrate India’s scientific temper and willingness to implement globally compatible, evidence-based and proportionate policy solutions.

Sidharth is Associate Director, Public Policy at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a leading public policy firm based in Delhi.

Authors: Rohit Kumar & Akshat Sogani
Published: 14th October, 2024 in The Hindu

This year’s summer shattered records in India, with red alerts issued nationwide. Over 200 lives were officially lost to heatwaves, but countless more went unrecorded. Delhi experienced an unprecedented 50+°C. With the progress of the monsoon and the memory of the extreme heat far behind us, we risk ignoring a critical warning.

In the last decade, urban areas in India have faced increasingly severe and frequent heatwaves, largely due to the urban heat island (UHI) effect. This phenomenon, where cities are significantly warmer than their rural counterparts, is driven by carbon-emitting human activities. Urban design exacerbates this effect, with concrete, asphalt, and glass structures retaining heat. In corporate hubs such as Gurugram, sleek glass buildings, while modern and attractive, trap heat and increase energy consumption. The reflections from these buildings and the lack of green cover further worsen conditions for those outside.

The marginalised bear the brunt

The severity of these issues demands immediate attention, as poor urban planning disproportionately affects marginalised communities. Delivery boys, who navigate city streets to meet the demand for online orders, face relentless heat with little relief. Auto drivers are directly exposed to the scorching heat of the day as they strive to earn a living. So do construction workers who are forced to work long hours outdoors, enduring the hot sun without adequate shade or hydration. Women domestic workers frequently travel by foot, and street vendors constantly battle the whims of the weather, with their earnings declining as foot traffic reduces due to the heat. These individuals face the harshest consequences of poor urban planning. They are on the front lines, experiencing the direct impact of rising temperatures, poor air quality, and the scarcity of green spaces.

Poor urban planning remains unchecked in part because the privileged, who have more influence, are less affected. And technology is enabling this by lulling us into inaction. In air-conditioned environments, the comforts provided by technology further insulate the privileged from the harsh realities of urban life, diminishing their incentive to push for change. Grocery delivery apps reduce the need to step outside for basic needs. For even minor repairs, we turn to apps for doorstep services, and ride-hailing apps encourage us to take cabs for short distances. This unintended consequence of our thriving app ecosystem, built on a labour surplus economy, has not been widely discussed in public discourse and warrants a deeper examination for its societal implications.

Our tech-enabled ecosystem has redefined the concept of “luxury”, creating a comfort trap that reduces our motivation to engage with the outside world. It has led to greater human domestication and a detachment from the environment around us. Tech coupled with privilege has also invisibilised labour, which is making us lose our empathy. In service complexes, guards receive deliveries at building gates, reducing our interaction with the people who serve us. In all these instances, a common theme is that the urban elite are willing to pay a premium to trade discomfort for convenience. Unfortunately, the insulation of the upper classes from the external environment has profound implications for urban governance and the local economy.

When the privileged encounter issues like poor public services or inadequate infrastructure, these problems are more likely to gain media attention and prompt governmental action. For instance, the recent flash storm in Delhi filled many posh basements and even MP houses in Lutyen’s Delhi. This led to swift action from authorities and water pumps were commanded into action to pump out the water. Similarly, public schools often lack resources because the affluent prefer private institutions, and public transportation receives less focus and funding as the elite avoid using it.

Even more worrisome is the fact that we are entering a vicious cycle. While heatwaves force people indoors, technology enables this behaviour, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: worsening urban conditions make outdoor engagement unbearable which further increases reliance on technology. As a result, the wealthy demand fewer public service improvements, making cities less livable for everyone.

The broader societal implications of this change are alarming. As technology is integrating further into our lives, it is reshaping our expectations of urban living. But this intergration is not improving the quality of life for the general populace. Instead, it is aggravating existing inequalities and creating new ones.

The need to reconnect

The real challenge lies in breaking free from this comfort trap. Reconnecting with our cities and each other is not just a noble goal, it is essential for our collective survival. We have to snap out of our false sense of comfort and recognise that our world is changing in fundamental ways. We are losing our public spaces and our ability to enjoy outdoor activities due to increasingly frequent extreme weather events. The urban elite must, therefore, leverage their privilege to actively engage with governments and help improve living conditions in our cities. Only by confronting the true state of our urban areas can we hope to rebuild them as equitable, liveable spaces for all.

Let us not let convenience become the architect of our cities’ demise.

Rohit is the co-founder and Akshat is an Associate at Young Leaders for Active Citizenship (YLAC) and The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a multi sectoral public policy firm.

Authors: Sona Mitra, Sruthi Kutty, and Sonakshi Chaudhry
Published: August 30th, 2024 in The Hindu

Nari Shakti or women-led development remains at the core of announcements made by the hon’ble FM in this year’s budget, placed recently. The FM reiterated the government’s commitment to women’s empowerment that was reflected in budget allocations to pro-women programmes, as reported by the Gender budget Statement (GBS). The GB reached 1% of the GDP estimates in 2024-25 and the overall allocations stand at more than 3 lakh crores INR for pro-women programmes.

The GBS, since it was first introduced in 2005-06, consistently reported an average share of 5% of the total budgetary allocations, with marginal ups and downs. This year is special as the share of allocations to pro-women schemes stands at approximately 6.8% of the total budget expenditure for 2024-25, which is way above the usual trends and marks a positive departure from the earlier status quo.

The increase in the GB allocations are driven by two major factors – a part of this increase has been on account of newly included Part ‘C,’ a third part in the GBS that reports pro-women schemes with less than 30% provisioning for women. The PM Kisan scheme in the agriculture sector has been reported in part C with an outlay of INR 15,000 crore. This is 25% of the total outlay towards the programme.

The second factor driving the overall increase is driven by an increase in part A of the statement. Part A reports expenditures in schemes with 100% allocations for women. Part A had previously constituted 15-17% of overall allocations reported in the GBS till BE 2022-23. Since BE 2023-24, there was a sudden increase in the allocations in part A that raised the share of pro-women schemes with 100% allocations for women to almost 40% and above (figure 1). This was mainly due to a change in reporting where the PM Awas Yojana both rural and urban were reported in part A instead of part B. Incidentally, part B of the GBS reports programmes with allocations of 30-99% for women and hence only a part of Awas Yojana were reported earlier. This year the entire allocation of INR 80,670 crore, has been reported under part A.

Figure 1: Total allocations under Part A as share of total GB

Additionally, the entire allocation to the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM) is reflected in Part A of the GBS, indicating that 100% of its outlay is dedicated to women and girls, which is technically correct and should have been done earlier. This is a welcome update from the Budgeted Estimates of 2023-24, where only 50% of the scheme’s total outlay used to be reflected in part B of the GBS.The GBS also correctly reported increased allocations for the Ministry of Electronics & IT and 48% of Jal Jeevan Mission in Part B. Meanwhile, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), which has the third highest allocation among schemes for women in the GBS, is currently reported under Part B with INR 28,888.67 crore, or 33.6% of its total outlay. It is important to note that women generated 59.3% of all person days as of December 2023, and should have received commensurate wages from the total MGNREGA budget, yet only 33.6% gets reflected in the GBS. The GBS also missed on reporting on the schemes for women entrepreneurs such as PM Vishwakarma, SVANidhi, and Stand-Up India. However, PM Employment Generation Programme (PMEGP), which aims to assist entrepreneurs in setting up micro businesses in the non-farm sector, received a GBS allocation of INR 920 crore or 40% of the total allocation to PMEGP.

Experts for long have been pointing to the need for a detailed, three-part GBS to address reporting anomalies. To further strengthen it, the exercise should also include respective rationale for such reporting to ensure accuracy of allocations and reduce the probability of missing allocations.  The current format of the GBS gives hope for a better utilization of the tool in future.

Gender responsive budgeting is a powerful tool to close the gender gaps in an economy. Several years of advocating for improved reporting in the GBS by a range of stakeholders is reflected in the inclusion of a third part. However, it needs to be emphasized that detailed reporting is not a mere exercise in increasing the quantum of allocations reported for women’s development – it is an exercise to ensure actual spending for women in all government programmes, that are well planned and designed to include women’s needs from its inception. This will be achieved only when the GB tool is used effectively at all levels of the Union and the state government departments. That said, the promise to lead a path of women-led development can be fulfilled only when there is active participation of women in policy decisions as well as including women at the inception of programme designing. This will ensure that the benefits of development are distributed equitably amongst women and girls.

Sona Mitra and Sruthi Kutty work with IWWAGE, an initiative of LEAD at Krea University, and Sonakshi Chaudhry works at The Quantum Hub (TQH Consulting).

Authors: Ujval Mohan & Akanksha Ghosh
Date: 1^st August, 2024

For content creators and consumers alike, the 2020s have been transformative. Hundreds of creative Indians attained fame and fortune, with countless more looking forward to leverage India’s booming content economy. That may change if the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (MIB) implements proposed regulations aimed at content creators on social media platforms.

MIB is reportedly considering regulating “news and current affairs” content on social media platforms under the draft Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill. Concerningly, some interpret that the Bill goes even further, impacting  high-reach content creators even if they do not create news and current affairs content.

Though MIB is yet to clearly state its objective driving this proposal, drafts have been shared with select stakeholders as per reports. Following this, critique on opaque consultations and potential free speech implications have rightly dominated discourse. However, its potential to stymie India’s ambitions of a shining content economy is equally concerning. It is clear that MIB’s proposal perhaps sacrifices too much to achieve too little.

Impact on India’s Content Creation Economy

India’s content creation economy is exploding, with 100mn+ content creators putting out content. YouTube’s creator ecosystem alone contributed INR 16,000 crore to India’s 2022 GDP by some estimates, rivaling contributions by traditional industries. The sector has leveraged the borderless internet to enhance India’s soft-power appeal and expand the market for India-created content. For individuals, there is a promising chance of monetizing their creativity outside conventional employment avenues. To find Indian music routinely making it to top trending lists is emblematic not just of the art’s popularity but also of an untapped economic opportunity, which hasn’t gone unrecognized. PM Modi heralded social media creators as ambassadors of “vocal for local” innovation, urging them to engage global audiences.

MIB’s proposal threatens this achievable vision. Creators have innovated precisely because of vast freedoms in choosing how they entertain their audience. Imposing close scrutiny and bureaucratic compliances on self-driven entertainers will erode incentives to operate in this buoyant arena. If every vlogger has to ‘intimate’ the Government of their follower count, set up a ‘content evaluation committee’ to approve their uploads and fulfill other such regulatory requirements, fewer Indians would take up such creative endeavors.

The ability to impulsively leverage audience engagement, mix and match genres, and ‘meme’-ify dull topics will weaken if content standards similar to MIB’s ‘Program and Advertising Code’ (Code) would apply to our favorite vloggers the way it applies to TV channels, all to the detriment of the overall content economy.

Key Unanswered Questions: Practical Challenges

Who will these regulations apply to? To craft this law, MIB has the unenviable task of defining ideas like “professional”, “content creation,” and importantly, “news and current affairs content”. MIB’s definition seems to draw the line at content of “socio-political, economic or cultural nature”, which could arguably describe much online content. This begs the question, would meme-based sports updates be considered ‘news and current affairs’? Would an engineer who vlogs their daily routine be considered a ‘professional content creator’? Would a channel that comments on social issues while mostly posting baking or make-up tutorials have to abide by the Code? These are not hypothetical edge-cases but represent the bulk of routine dilemmas and disputes that will arise when regulation meant for traditional media is imposed on a fundamentally different internet environment.

Even if that barrier is crossed, who will enforce the new law? Users upload tremendously large amounts of content to platforms everyday. Follower/subscriber reach too is dynamic and changes week-on-week, such that who is popular today may be forgotten next week. Further, content creators can have inconsistent reach/popularity between platforms and often cross-pollinate their content, which adds to this complexity. Agencies/regulators enforcing the new law will likely struggle to mobilize resources to monitor creators’ reach on a given day, and check that their content is Code-friendly.

Reports suggest that social media operators may have greater due-diligence obligations to enforce these laws. The existing IT Rules, 2021 already set out content moderation mandates that require companies to address harmful and illegal content on social media. The new law could divert already stretched resources from pressing online safety issues to scrutinize routine uploads, subjecting users to collateral censorship triggered by the vague Code and threat of criminal penalties.

Looking Ahead

Given these challenges, it is worth recalling that MIB already has broad powers to prevent harmful content and is empowered to issue emergency directions to block content on any online forum. By contrast, the proposed law would add little to MIB’s existing arsenal to address harmful content. Instead, MIB and MeitY’s jurisdictions will intersect in vast plane covering most of the internet, creating everyday confusion for users, creators, and companies

In all, allowing MIB to dictate what one is permitted to “like, comment, or subscribe”  risks hurting incentives for creative Indians to earn and grow, and India’s ability to attract technology investment, while also failing Indian productive hunger for creative and engaging content.

Ujval Mohan is a Senior Analyst; and Akanksha Ghosh is an Analyst working on technology policy issues at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a multi sectoral public policy firm.

Authors: Rohit Kumar & Srijan Rai

Published: August 6th, 2024 in The Indian Express

A draft version of the Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2024 has been recently circulated among a handful of stakeholders from the industry by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB). This Bill aims to extend the regulations currently applied to traditional television and radio, to the internet. While seemingly designed to consolidate existing guidelines and increase accountability among broadcasters, the Bill does much more. It is expansive in its remit, covers all large influencers, content creators, and political commentators online, and tries to regulate speech. If introduced and passed in Parliament, the Bill could significantly undermine creative independence and stymie online freedom of expression in India.

Recent elections have shown that digital media can serve as a critical alternative space for creators and commentators to scrutinize government policies and demand accountability. It can enable dissenting voices that don’t find traction in mainstream media and help organize counter-narratives around critical issues – all vital for a well-functioning and vibrant democracy. The Broadcasting Services bill threatens to disrupt this dynamic.

Selective consultation and regulatory overreach

The draft Bill reimagines the term ‘broadcaster’ to include digital news broadcasters, defining them as anyone who ‘systematically’ broadcasts news and current affairs online, including on social media platforms via text, video or audio. What this means is that commentators on YouTube, Twitter, blogging portals or podcasts discussing current affairs and socio-political issues will all get covered under the Bill.

Digital news broadcasters with a certain threshold of subscribers/viewers must notify the government, conform to a Programme Code, set up a grievance redressal mechanism, and adhere to a three-tier regulatory structure. For content other than current affairs (a programme providing historical overview, for instance), broadcasters are also required to get pre-certification by a ‘Content Evaluation Committee’ that they set up. While allowing users to raise complaints against Programme Code violations, the Bill also gives the central government the power to impose penalties, direct broadcasters to go off-air, and even prohibit transmission in the interest of sovereignty, security, public order, decency, morality, or foreign relations.

While some of these requirements may seem benign and perhaps an attempt to equalize TV and internet broadcasters, this view overlooks critical issues and ignores fundamental differences between TV and the internet. Unlike TV where linear programming is disseminated one to many, content on the internet is demand-based and one-to-one. It’s not clear, therefore, why they should be regulated in the same manner. Second, by opening the door for regulating social and political commentators and granting the government broad powers to intervene, we run the risk of serious censorship. Already, constitutional challenges to Part III of the Information Technology (IT) Rules, 2021, which attempted to create government oversight over media, have led to these Rules being stayed by the Courts.

Third, unlike TV broadcasters with significant resources, many commentators on the internet are smaller-scale content creators and independent journalists. Applying the same regulations as TV on these broadcasters and requiring pre-certification of creative content, can unfairly burden these players and significantly increase costs while reducing speed to market.

Extra-territorial application

Unlike the 2023 version of this Bill, the current draft does not restrict the application of the law to broadcasters who are citizens of India or entities registered in India, potentially bringing global content creators, news publishers, and commentators of current affairs within the scope of the Bill. Does this mean that every foreign influencer, journalist or commentator with significant reach in India (think John Oliver, Trevor Noah, Fareed Zakaria as examples) will have to intimate the Indian government of their presence and comply with the Programme Code and adhere to the three-tier governance framework? Given the global nature of the internet, how will this provision even work?

Threatening safe harbour, yet again

The Bill imposes new obligations on social media intermediaries, including compliance with government demands for information about broadcasters on their platforms. The Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, and the accompanying IT Rules already require social media intermediaries to establish grievance redressal mechanisms, comply with government orders, and operate a notice-and-takedown regime for flagged content. Introducing parallel legislation to regulate social media intermediaries and threatening safe harbour protections will only add to the regulatory quagmire and create a chilling effect on free speech.

Respecting free speech and recognizing the limitations of internet regulation

Regulating content on the internet presents inherent challenges due to the global, decentralized nature of the web. Unlike traditional media, the internet hosts a far greater number of creators and influencers, there is a lot more content being generated, and the dissemination of this content transcends national boundaries, making jurisdictional enforcement complex and often impractical. Attempts to impose stringent regulations – what MIB seems to be doing through the current Bill – can lead to serious consequences. If the government is concerned about fake news or harmful/ misleading content, other mechanisms need to be leveraged, like the IT Act 2000 which already provides for a flagging and takedown regime.

The draft Broadcasting Bill, 2024 needs a serious rethink. At the minimum, it requires thorough deliberation and discussion with a broad and diverse range of stakeholders before it is made into law. This legislation isn’t just about a few companies and media outlets – it is about the future of the internet and the digital citizens on it.

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Rohit is Founding Partner and Srijan is an Associate at The Quantum Hub (TQH) – a public policy firm

Authors: Shashank Pandey & Srijan Rai

Published: 7th August, 2024 in The Print

On 29 July, the Union government released draft amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules 2017. Prima facie, the objective of such an amendment is to tighten the requirements for obtaining a disability certificate. This action by the government appears to be influenced by a recent controversy involving a former trainee IAS officer misusing a disability certificate. However, this move is expected to create further delays and additional barriers for Indians with disabilities seeking certification.

The proposed amendment to Rule 18 increases the certification period from one month to three months. A pressing concern is that there is no clarity on when the three-month period begins. Currently, disability certificates must be issued within one month “from the date of receipt of the application”. The amendment eliminates this deadline and stipulates that the certificate or Unique Disability ID (UDID) be issued within three months “if any disability is diagnosed”. Thus, it is unclear whether this three-month period will start from the date of the application or from when the medical authority confirms the disability.

The existing timeline of one month is not fulfilled in most cases. One of the co-authors of this article applied for certificate renewal and has not received it even after six hospital visits and more than 50 days since applying. The recent amendment is likely to further delay certificate issuance.

The extension of the timeline exacerbates the difficulties of persons with disabilities (PwDs) in obtaining certification for education or employment, where documentation deadlines are often tight. Instead of diagnosing the underlying issues in the current system, the new rules will lead to further setbacks and complications.

Complex assessment process

Amendment to Rule 17 of the RPwD Rules introduces the mandate to submit identity proofs in addition to the previously required Aadhar number. The process for availing Aadhar card is already tedious for many PwDs who don’t enjoy the exemption from biometric requirements under Aadhar laws. Additionally, the application for issuance of a disability certificate or UDID must be submitted only to the medical authority or any other competent ‘medical’ authority at the applicant’s place of residence. The rationale for adding the term ‘medical’ is unclear and may be directed to exclude authorities like blind school principals and those who have certification powers in special cases.

Earlier this year, the central government issued revised assessment guidelines to simplify the process for PwDs. The certification process, carried out by state governments, is based on these guidelines and specifies medical authorities responsible for assessments. However, the process at the state level suffers from a lack of expertise and know-how in the medical assessment panels.

The assessment process, based on the medical model of disability, grants significant discretion to doctors. The time required for proper assessment varies across states, districts, and hospitals. The current certification process involves multiple examination levels that vary across disabilities, leading to inconsistent diagnosis of disability percentages. This inconsistency is particularly problematic for individuals with invisible disabilities or symptoms, such as multiple sclerosis, thalassemia, sickle cell, and learning disabilities, among others. Such stringent rules and discretion with medical authority with an extended timeline for certification can be exclusionary in practice.

Creating ambiguity

The proposed amendment also formalises the UDID issuance process by giving it statutory authority. It introduces three types of UDIDs: White (for less than 40 per cent disability), yellow (40 per cent to 80 per cent) and blue (more than 80 per cent). However, this sub-categorisation without specification of the corresponding benefits can lead to further confusion in assessments and allocation of benefits. Last year, the central government made UDID compulsory for availing of the facilities of 17 centrally sponsored schemes. The sub-categorisation might lead to exclusion or preferential treatment within such schemes or potentially stigmatise holders of white or yellow UDID cards.

The UDID is still not widely accepted for accessing various facilities. For example, the Ministry of Railways and several state-level schemes still require separate certifications for benefits. The disability certificates/UDIDs often need further medical assessments for exams like UPSC and NEET. This multiplicity of certifications adds a bureaucratic burden, risks contradictory assessments, and may lead to confusion and denial of benefits. It raises the question of whether these extensive certification processes are enabling provisions for PwDs or merely creating artificial barriers to their empowerment.

Amendment influenced by social outrage

The proposed changes reveal a misguided belief that the primary issue is the prevalence of fake certificates rather than the systemic barriers PwDs face. Extending the certification period and implementing stricter assessment or sub-categorisation measures could further marginalise PwDs with disability percentages close to 40 per cent or those with invisible disabilities. Such measures contradict the spirit of the Rights of Person with Disabilities Act, 2016, which seeks to promote inclusion and accessibility for PwDs. Certification is a fundamental prerequisite for the inclusion of PwDs.

These new requirements threaten to obfuscate the real issues—namely, the system’s rigging by privileged individuals. Genuine PwDs already face immense difficulties in obtaining certification, and the recent amendment can make this process even more arduous. It is disheartening that the amendments have been encouraged by public fear rather than the need to promote true inclusion.

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Shashank Pandey is a lawyer and founder of the Politics and Disability Forum. Srijan Rai, is a policy researcher and Associate, Public Policy at The Quantum Hub (TQH).

Authors: Aditi Jha and Aparajita Bharti

Published: 7th August 2024 in Hindustan Times

A decade ago, the Companies Act of 2013 and SEBI’s 2014 rules sparked hope for significant shifts in corporate leadership demographics. The Companies Act of 2013 requied certain classes of companies to have at least one woman director on their boards, while SEBI’s 2014 rules limited independent directors’ tenures to two consecutive terms i.e. 10 years. These measures aimed to enhance gender diversity and leadership within corporate boards. As a result, over the years, women’s representation on boards has increased from 6% in 2013 to 18.3% in 2023.

The progress has been incremental but also slow and uneven. As per a report by Fortune India and SP Jain Institute of Management and Research, only 20% of Fortune 500 companies in India met the requirement of having at least one woman director as of 2023. With approximately 30,000 independent directors set to complete their 10-year term in 2024, it remains to be seen how companies refresh their boards this year. At this critical juncture, companies have the opportunity to walk the talk on diversity and gender inclusion. But at the same time, we must also remember that the Board is not where womens’ leadership journeys begin.

The leaky pipeline continues to hamper women representation

LinkedIn’s Economic Graph data reveals that globally women comprise 42% of the workforce. However, they only hold 31.7% of senior leadership positions. Further, the hiring of women in leadership roles has declined since 2021 globally, dropping from 37.5% to 36.4% by early 2024. In India, in contrast, there has been an increase in female representation in senior leadership roles albeit on a much lower base. It has risen from 16.6% in 2016 to 18.7% in 2023, slightly dipping to 18.5% by May 2024. Female leadership hires increased from 18.8% in 2016 to 25.2% in 2021, then declined to 23.4% by May 2024.

The concept of a “leaky pipeline” aptly describes the career trajectory of women in the workforce. While women show strong representation at entry and senior individual contributor levels, there is a notable decline as they move into managerial roles. Starting at 29% at the entry level, female representation drops significantly at the managerial level and continues to decrease through the director and vice president levels, ultimately reaching just 15.3% at the C-suite level. This decline often coincides with life stages where women face increased pressures from marriage and caregiving responsibilities, leading to higher attrition rates.

Uneven progress in women representation across sectors

Sector-specific trends further highlight the challenges and opportunities. Globally, women make up only 28.2% of the workforce in STEM fields, in stark contrast to 47.3% in non-STEM sectors. Yet, emerging technology sectors show promise, with the number of women in AI engineering having more than doubled since 2016.

In India, the landscape is varied: Financial Services and Technology sectors see around 19% female representation in senior roles, whereas Education and Government Administration boast higher figures at 30% and 28.7% respectively. Other fields like Consumer Services, Professional Services, Hospitals, and Health Care also show moderate female leadership representation, indicating pockets of progress amidst broader challenges.

Conversely, Construction, Oil & Gas, Mining, and Utilities traditionally perceived as a “male domain” have female representation below 10% in senior roles. These insights reveal that certain sectors require more concerted interventions to make them gender inclusive. Occupational segregation disproportionately impacts Indian working women, and limits their career growth opportunities. For instance, industries such as Construction, Manufacturing, and Oil, Gas, and Mining face entrenched gender stereotypes, a lack of female role models, and work environments that discourage female participation.

So, how can we bring change and make the workforce more inclusive for women?

LinkedIn’s Economic Graph findings also reveal that while it is crucial to drive compliance of existing mandates, it is  also important to go beyond them to prepare women to take leadership roles in their careers. Implementing supportive workplace practices like flexible hours, remote work where possible, and childcare support can aid in retaining more women in the workforce. Women returning to work after maternity leave need special support and flexibility so that they can continue their career trajectories. Further, while evidence suggests that women in leadership can foster more gender-responsive organisations, it’s essential to recognize that women taking up these roles require additional support to bring about these changes. Mentorship support is required for women at all stages of their careers as they have fewer role models.

On a broader level, we need more nudges for organisations to be intentional in fostering women leaders. Establishing a National Dashboard on Women’s Leadership in the private sector can aid in tracking progress, showcasing successful initiatives, and disseminating best practices across industries. We also need increased investment in care infrastructure and policy action towards paternal leaves to redistribute women’s workload at home.

With “Women-led development” firmly on the government’s agenda, women’s representation and leadership in the private sector is an important piece of the puzzle. Women in leadership in each industry open up new opportunities for the next generation. Sectoral gender disaggregated data on job roles can help us identify crucial roadblocks, so that we can remove them one by one.

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Aditi Jha is the Country Head, Legal & Government Affairs and board member at Linkedin India. Aparajita Bharti is the Founding Partner of The Quantum Hub (TQH) Consulting, a public policy firm.